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EVOLUTIONARY  SELECTION  IN  NORMAL-FORM  GAMES 
BY  KLAus  RITZBERGER  AND JORGEN W.  WEIBULL1 
This paper investigates  stability properties of  evolutionary  selection dynamics  in 
normal-form  games.  The analysis  is focused  on deterministic  dynamics  in continuous  time 
and on asymptotic  stability  of sets of population  states, more precisely  of faces of the 
mixed-strategy  space. The main result is a characterization  of those faces which are 
asymptotically  stable in all dynamics  from a certain  class, and we show that every such 
face contains an essential component of  the  set  of  Nash equilibria,  and hence a 
strategically  stable  set in the sense of Kohlberg  and Mertens  (1986). 
KEYWORDS:  Dynamics,  evolution,  noncooperative  games,  stability. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
MOST APPLICATIONS  OF NONCOOPERATIVE  GAME  THEORY  build on such solution 
concepts as  Nash equilibrium.  As  is  well known by now, the  rationalistic 
foundation  of this approach  is quite demanding.  Not only is it required  that 
agents be optimizers,  but it also presumes a large degree of coordination  of 
different  agents'  expectations  (see, e.g., Tan and Werlang  (1988), and Aumann 
and Brandenburger  (1992)).  In recent years researchers  have investigated  alter- 
native foundations  of Nash equilibrium  play. Particularly  promising  seems the 
approach  taken in evolutionary  game theory. Instead of asking if agents are 
rational  in some epistemologically  well-defined  sense, one asks if evolutionary 
selection processes induce a  tendency towards aggregate Nash equilibrium 
behavior.  In other words,  one then investigates  the validity  of Friedman's  (1953) 
"as if' paradigm  in the context of strategic  interaction. 
The idea of an "as if'  interpretation  of equilibrium  points, however,  dates 
back to the early  days of Nash equilibrium: 
"We shall  now take up the "mass-action"  interpretation  of equilibrium  points. ...  It is 
unnecessary  to assume  that the participants  have full knowledge  of the total structure  of 
the game, or the ability  and inclination  to go through  any complex  reasoning  processes. 
But the participants  are supposed  to accumulate  empirical  information  on the relative 
advantages  of the various  pure strategies  at their disposal. 
To be more  detailed,  we assume  that there is a population  (in the sense of statistics)  of 
participants  for each position  of the game.  Let us also assume  that the "average  playing" 
of the game involves  n participants  selected at random  from  the n populations,  and that 
there is a stable average  frequency  with which each pure strategy  is employed  by the 
"average  member"  of the appropriate  population. 
Since there is to be no collaboration  between  individuals  playing  in different  positions 
of the game,  the probability  that a particular  n-tuple  of pure strategies  will be employed 
in a playing  of the game should  be the product  of the probabilities  indicating  the chance 
of each of the n pure  strategies  to be employed  in a random  playing.  ... 
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bauer,  a co-editor,  and three anonymous  referees,  and thank  the Industrial  Institute  for Economic 
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Thus the assumptions  we made in  this "mass-action"  interpretation  lead to  the 
conclusion  that the mixed strategies  representing  the average  behavior  in each of the 
populations  form  an equilibrium  point.... 
Actually,  of course,  we can only  expect  some sort of approximate  equilibrium,  since the 
information,  its utilization,  and the stability  of the average  frequencies  will be imperfect." 
(Nash  (1950,  p. 21-23).) 
There are several  approaches  to formalize  the above ideas. One is to investi- 
gate the dynamics  of social evolution.  The best studied setting for evolutionary 
dynamics  was originally  motivated by biology and concerns pairwise random 
matchings  of individuals  drawn from a  single infinitely  large population and 
playing a  symmetric  two-player  game. In  the  so-called replicator dynamics 
(Taylor  and Jonker (1978)) individuals  change from currently  worse to better 
strategies  at rates which are proportional  to current  payoff  differences.  Results 
for  the  single-population  case  are  encouraging for  the  Nash  equilibrium 
paradigm.  Weak  dynamic  stability  in the replicator  dynamics  was shown  to imply 
symmetric  Nash equilibrium  behavior  (Bomze (1986)) and, for a broad class of 
dynamics,  it was established that convergence  to  a stationary  state from an 
interior  initial state also implies  Nash equilibrium  behavior  (Nachbar  (1990)). 
However,  many economic applications  call for multi-population,  rather  than 
single-population  dynamics.  For instance, the player roles may be  those of 
"buyers"  and "sellers,"  each type of individual  being drawn  from his or her 
"player-role  population."  Moreover,  in most applications,  the game will not be 
symmetric  and may involve more than two players.  Thus one is lead to study 
evolutionary  selection dynamics  in n-player  games, in which each player  role is 
represented by a  distinct population in  the  spirit of  Nash's "mass-action" 
interpretation-the topic of the present  paper. 
Individuals  are randomly  drawn  from infinitely  large populations  also in the 
multi-population  setting. Each matching  involves one individual  from each of 
the player-populations  and each individual  is "programmed"  to  use a pure 
strategy  available  to the player whose role she plays. Over time the strategy 
distribution  in  each player population changes according to  some dynamic 
selection process. The present paper studies classes of such dynamics  all of 
which  include  the replicator  dynamics,  as well as a family  of imitation  dynamics. 
And indeed, the earlier positive results from the symmetric  single-population 
setting do carry  over to the (symmetric  and asymmetric)  multi-population  case. 
Again weak dynamic  stability  properties  and convergence  imply Nash equilib- 
rium behavior  (Friedman  (1991), Samuelson  and Zhang (1992); see Section 3 
below for details). 
There is an important  caveat to these positive results, viz. that few Nash 
equilibria  have strong stability  properties  in multi-population  dynamics.  More 
precisely,  only strict equilibria  are asymptotically  stable in the replicator  dynam- 
ics (Ritzberger  and Vogelsberger  (1990, Proposition  1)), and virtually  only strict 
equilibria are asymptotically  stable in so-called aggregate monotonic selection 
dynamics  (Samuelson  and Zhang (1992, Theorem 4 and Corollary  1)). Conse- 
quently,  many  games possess no asymptotically  stable equilibrium  at all. Hence, EVOLUTIONARY  SELECTION  1373 
the connection between evolutionary  selection in  n-player games and Nash 
equilibrium  is weaker  than it may first appear. 
Since these negative  results  concern  individual  points in the strategy  space, it 
is natural  to turn to sets instead. Nontrivial  connected sets of Nash equilibria 
are endemic  in normal-form  games  that derive  from  extensive  forms,  and part  of 
the refinement literature has also turned to set-valued solution concepts in 
order  to cope with existence  problems. 
There are a number  of set-valued  approaches  in the literature  on evolutionary 
game theory  as well. Thomas  (1985) develops  a set-valued  generalization  of the 
static  concept  of evolutionarily  stable  strategies  (Maynard  Smith  and Price  (1973)). 
Swinkels  (1992a, 1992b)  also proposes  set-valued  generalizations  of evolutionar- 
ily stable strategies and shows that those sets contain sets of Nash equilibria 
which  meet certain  refinement  criteria.  Swinkels  (1993) deduces the latter from 
dynamic  asymptotic  stability  of sets in a selection dynamics  from a broad  class. 
In the present paper we focus on asymptotic  stability  of a certain class of 
strategy  sets, namely  faces of the mixed  strategy  space of the game.  A face is the 
Cartesian  product  of sets of mixed strategies,  one set for each player,  each of 
which  consists  of all mixtures  over some subset of the player's  pure strategy  set. 
At one extreme  end of this spectrum  there are individual  pure strategy  combina- 
tions (minimal  faces). The opposite extreme is the set of  all mixed strategy 
combinations  in the game (the maximal  face). Dynamic  stability  properties  of 
faces can thus be  associated with predictions in  terms of  subsets of  pure 
strategies,  one subset for each player  position. 
The focus on asymptotic  stability  is due to the fact that this property,  unlike 
the weaker  criterion  of Lyapunov  stability,  is a "structurally  robust"  property  in 
the sense that it is not destroyed  by small perturbations  of (the vector field of) 
the  dynamics. In  particular,  asymptotic stability is  preserved even if  small 
fractions  of a population  occasionally  "mutate,"  "experiment,"  or "make mis- 
takes,"  thus generating  small shocks  to the population  state. 
A similar robustness  criterion motivates the focus on faces. Since in many 
applications  only broad qualitative  features of the selection dynamics  are know 
or assumed, it is desirable that the sets under consideration  be dynamically 
stable in a fairly  wide class of selection dynamics.  We show that such broader 
robustness  of dynamic  stability  properties disqualifies  all (closed) sets in the 
(relative) interior of any face. Hence, when such robustness  is called for, the 
restriction  to sets which are faces is not so severe, and asymptotic  stability 
provides  predictions  which are immune  to small amounts  of (unmodeled)  drift. 
Our main  result  is a characterization  of all faces which  are set-wise  asymptoti- 
cally  stable in all dynamics  from a class of dynamics  which  contains  all aggregate 
monotonic selection dynamics.  The characterizing  criterion is that the set in 
question  be "closed"  under a certain  correspondence  which  we call the "better- 
reply"  correspondence-in  analogy with the well-known best-reply  correspon- 
dence used in noncooperative  game theory.  This "new"  correspondence  assigns 
to each mixed strategy  combination cr those pure strategies for each player 
which give that player at least the same payoff as she has in  cr. Such pure 1374  K.  RITZBERGER AND  J.  W.  WEIBULL 
strategies  are thus weakly  better  replies  to o- than o- is itself. We call a product 
set of pure strategies  closed under  the better-reply  correspondence  if the image 
under  this correspondence  of every  mixed strategy  combination  with support  in 
the set is contained  in the set. (Such a set is necessarily  "closed  under rational 
behavior,"  or a curb  set; see Basu and Weibull  (1991).) 
The equivalence  of closure  under  the better-reply  correspondence  and asymp- 
totic stability  of the associated  face provides  an operational  criterion  by means 
of which pure strategy  subsets spanning  an asymptotically  stable face can be 
identified,  a criterion  based exclusively  on the data of the game. In particular 
examples  this criterion  has significant  cutting  power  (see Section  6). However,  as 
yet the strength  of the criterion  in general remains an open issue. Therefore, 
there may  be many  games  where few pure strategies  can be "robustly"  rejected 
on grounds  of dynamic  social evolution  as modeled  here. 
There is  a  stark contrast between "robust"  evolutionary  predictions and 
noncooperative  game theory  concerning  completely  mixed  Nash equilibria.  For 
while these pass all the Nash equilibrium  refinements  based on strategy  pertur- 
bations  ("trembles"),  no such equilibrium  is robustly  stable in the present  class 
of evolutionary  selection dynamics.  More precisely,  even if such an equilibrium 
is dynamically  stable in some aggregate monotonic selection dynamics,  it is 
unstable  in others. Hence, unless we are convinced  that "real life" adaption  is 
well described  by dynamics  in the "stable  subclass,"  we may  have to live with the 
possibility  of ever-lasting  oscillations  in certain  aggregate  social behaviors.2 
We also show  that a face spanned  by a product  set of pure strategies  which  is 
closed under the better-reply  correspondence  contains an essential  component 
of Nash equilibria.  That is, it contains a closed and connected set of Nash 
equilibria  such that every  nearby  game, in terms of pure strategy  payoffs,  has a 
nearby  Nash equilibrium.  This is one of the most stringent  set-wise  refinements 
from the noncooperative  game theory literature,  implying strategic  stability  in 
the sense of Kohlberg  and Mertens  (1986). 
Put together with the  above characterization  result, one obtains that an 
asymptotically  stable face contains an essential component  of Nash equilibria. 
This implication  parallels  Theorem  1 in Swinkels  (1993).  He shows  that if a set is 
asymptotically  stable in a selection dynamics  from a broad class, and meets a 
certain  topological  condition,  met by any face, then it contains  a hyperstable  set 
of Nash equilibria  in the sense of Kohlberg  and Mertens  (1986). 
The material  is organized  as follows. Section 2 contains notation and basic 
definitions.  Section 3 provides,  in a unified and sometimes  more general form, 
essentially  known  results on point-wise  stability  (except for Propositions  2 and 
3). All proofs  for this section have been relegated  to an Appendix  at the end of 
the paper.  In Section  4 we elaborate  on a class of correspondences  which  we call 
behavior  correspondences,  of which the best-reply  and better-reply  correspon- 
2Even  if  a  solution  persistently oscillates  the  time  average  of  the  population  state  may be  of 
significance. In games with a unique interior Nash equilibrium, for instance, it converges under the 
replicator dynamics to the equilibrium, provided the closure of the orbit is interior (cf. Hofbauer and 
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dences are instances,  and we relate sets closed under such correspondences  to 
the notions  of strict  and non-strict  Nash equilibrium.  Our main  result  is given  in 
Section  5. Section  6 contains  examples  of the concepts  used. Some directions  for 
further  research  are mentioned  in Section 7. 
2.  NOTATION AND  DEFINMONS 
2.1.  The Game 
Let  F  be  a normal-form  game with player set X= {1, 2,...,  n}, for some 
positive integer  n,  and with  S =  x ieSi  as the  set  of pure strategy combina- 
tions s =(  s2, ... ,  sn),  where each set  Si consists of  Ki pure strategies s5, 
k = 1,2, .. ., Ki, available  to player  i E AX.  The set of mixed  strategies  of player  i 
is thus the (Ki -  1)-dimensional unit simplex  Ai =  {ueI  E  1urk =  1), and 
A  = x,=  Ai is the polyhedron  of mixed strategy  combinations  o-  =  (-1,.  ..,  o  An) 
in the game. We identify  each pure strategy  si  E Si with the corresponding  unit 
vector ek E-  Ai (hence Si is the subset of vertices of  Ai). The support  of some 
mixed strategy  o-i  E Ai is denoted by supp(i)  = {si  E Siluik >  0). The mapping 
U: S  -+.> 9J  ngives  the payoffs  of pure strategy  combinations,  and the multilinear 
expected  payoff  function  U: A -,  I  'n  is defined  in the usual manner. 
Let  /  =  PBi:  A -> S be  the  pure best-reply correspondence which maps 
mixed strategy combinations  to  their pure best-reply strategy combinations. 
More precisely,  for each player i E: X  and strategy  combination  o-  E A, 
3i  ( cr) = {  Sk  E-  Si  lUi( cr_  i, Si)  2  U (c_is  )bs  ES}.  - {s  1L(i,S1)?L(o-_i  Si),g  VSi  = Si} 
The correspondence  assigning  mixed  best replies  is denoted i3  =  E  Pi , where 
/i(oT)  =  {&j E  AilSUpp(i)  C  i(of)}. 
It is well known  that both ,B  and /3 are u.h.c. correspondences  on A. 
A Nash equilibrium  is a strategy  combination  o-  E A which is a fixed  point of 
/3.  The set of Nash equilibria  of a game F  is denoted by 
E(F)  = {oE  AlIce  fi(o)}. 
A  strict equilibrium  is a strategy  combination  o-  E A which is its own unique 
best reply,  i.e., such that {or}  = ,B(o-).  Every  strict  equilibrium  o- e E(F)  is pure, 
so one may  view it as a fixed  point of  /3  in S. 
2.2.  Dynamics 
A  regular  selection  dynamics  on  A is a system of ordinary  differential  equa- 
tions (time indices suppressed) 
rIk =fOk(cr)ckO  Vk  =  1, ... .  Ki  Vi  EX= 1376  K.  RITZBERGER AND  J.  W.  WEIBULL 
with fi: A .  Ki  Vi  X, and f =  x<i xf  is such that 
(i) f  is Lipschitz  continuous  on A, 
(ii) fi(u-) -  o=O  ,  e  A, vi EA3 
As a consequence of the Picard-Lindelof  Theorem the above system has a 
unique  solution  cr(.,  uc):  9J  -> A through  every  initial state ocr E A, O(t,  u  E)  E 
A denoting the state at time t E 9t. All regular selection dynamics  have the 
property  that extinct  strategies  stay extinct  forever. 
The best studied regular  selection dynamics  in evolutionary  game theory is 
the so-called replicator  dynamics.  For an n-player game F,  this dynamics  is 
usually defined by the following system of  (quadratic)  ordinary differential 
equations  on the polyhedron  A: 
ik=  [4i(  cr_  -i( U(u)]  ik,  Vk= 
19  . . .,  Ki,  ViEX 
(see, e.g., Taylor  (1979), Zeeman (1980), Hofbauer  and Sigmund  (1988), Fried- 
man  (1991),  Samuelson  and Zhang  (1992)).  Altematively  the replicator  dynamics 
is sometimes  written 
J[(u-j,s  )U(cU)]au,  Vk-=  1,...  9,Ki,ViE, 
where the average  payoff to each population i, Ui(o), is taken to be positive 
(Maynard  Smith  (1982, p. 200), Hofbauer  and Sigmund  (1988, p. 273)).4 In the 
biology  literature,  "there is ... room for doubt as to which form is more appro- 
priate" (Maynard  Smith (1982, p. 201)). Following the economics literature 
(Samuelson  and Zhang  (1992, p. 370), Swinkels  (1993, p. 466)) we will hereafter 
refer to the first and more common version as the replicator  dynamics.  The 
second version  will be called the payoff-normalized replicator  dynamics.  As will 
be seen below, many of our results hold for classes of evolutionary  selection 
dynamics  which  contain  both versions. 
An  aggregate monotonic selection (AMS) dynamics (Samuelson  and  Zhang 
(1992)) is  a regular selection dynamics  such that for all  iE #,  o-E A, and 
0',qo it"  GE  Ai  , 
Ui(ocr_i,  0ri  <  Ui(ocr_i,  orj  )  <*fj(ocr) 
* 
ocri <  fi(ocr) 
* cri 
By a straightforward  generalization  of Theorem 3 in Samuelson and Zhang 
(1992, pp. 374) it can be shown that any AMS dynamics  can be written in the 
form 
fik(o-)=wi(o-)[Ui(os-i{sC)-Ui(o-)],  Vk=  1, ...  ,Ki, ViE  A, 
3This  definition can be shown to be equivalent to the one given by Samuelson and Zhang (1992, 
p. 368). 
4We  are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out. EVOLUTIONARY  SELECTION  1377 
for some  positive  function  wc:  A  ++  for  every  i E AX.  The  class  of  AMS 
dynamics  is thus given  by all "player-specific  reparameterizations  of time"  in the 
replicator  dynamics,  the latter  being the special  case c1i(o-)  = 1, Vou  e A, Vi e  X. 
The payoff-normalized  replicator  dynamics  is the special case with w1i(  u)= 
1Ui(o)  >  0, Veo  , Vi eX. 
A weaker  condition  than aggregate  monotonicity  is to require  the equivalence 
to hold only for pure strategies  oui'  = s' c  Si and  o-r"  = s" EC  Si. Such a selection 
dynamics  is called monotonic: 
Ui(cr_i,s  S)  <  Ui(cr_i,  Sh)  -fi  k(Of)  <fi  h(O) 
for all ie=-  X,  uEA,  and sS  G  ESi. 
Another  class of selection dynamics  which also contains  all AMS dynamics  is 
the following:  A  sign-preserving  selection  (SPS) dynamics  is a regular  selection 
dynamics  such that for all i e AX,  all o-  e A, and all sG E supp(  or) 
Ui(  cr_i,  Si  )  <  Ui(  cr)  fk(  cr)  <  O. 
In other words:  Strategies  which are at least as good as the average  grow at 
nonnegative  rates, and strategies  which perform  worse than average are pre- 
cisely those which are selected against.5  This class of selection dynamics  con- 
tains all AMS dynamics  and turns out to be of special significance  for the 
present  approach. 
For a SPS dynamics  the ordering  of growth  rates of population  shares is not 
determined  from payoffs,  while for a monotonic  selection dynamics  it is. On the 
other hand, for a monotonic selection dynamics  the signs of growth rates of 
population  shares of strategies that do neither best nor worst are not deter- 
mined, while for a SPS dynamics  they are. So, though the intersection  of the 
class of SPS dynamics  and monotonic  selection dynamics  is nonempty,  the two 
are distinct  classes. 
Aggregate  monotonicity,  which is thus a special case of both monotonic  and 
sign-preserving  selection dynamics,  can be derived  from underlying  microeco- 
nomic models that assume a certain imitative adaptation  of the behavior of 
individuals.  In large populations  one may imagine the following  scenario (for 
details  see Bjornerstedt  and Weibull  (1993)):  While at each instant  of time every 
individual  is bound to use a particular  pure strategy,  occasionally  one or the 
other individual  reviews  her or his strategy  choice. Suppose  these "arrival  times" 
are governed by independent Poisson processes, which may depend on the 
current  population  state. Once an individual  reviews  her strategy,  she will switch 
to a new pure strategy  with a conditional  probability  that may depend  positively 
on its current  success (payoff)  and popularity  (population  frequency).  Note that 
such an adaption process does not presume any knowledge  about payoffs to 
other player positions in the game. If, in particular,  individuals  with currently 
less successful strategies  review their strategy  choice at a linearly  higher rate 
5A  similar, though slightly stronger definition of "sign-preserving" dynamics appears in Nachbar 
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than individuals  with more successful  strategies,  and/or the conditional  switch- 
ing probability  towards  any pure strategy  is proportional  to its popularity,  with 
the proportionality  factor linearly  increasing  in the strategy's  current success, 
then an AMS dynamics  results.  In particular,  both the replicator  dynamics  and 
its payoff-normalized  version can be so derived.  Without  the linearity  assump- 
tions these imitation processes merely result in SPS or monotonic selection 
dynamics,  depending  on the nature  of the imitation  mechanism. 
Given  some regular  selection  dynamics  on the polyhedron  A of mixed  strategy 
combinations,  a set  A cA  is called positively  invariant  if any solution path 
starting in  A  remains in  A  for the  entire future: o-(t, o-)  EA,  Vo-0  EA, 
Vt E 91  +.  It is called invariant if, moreover,  any solution path in A  has also 
been in A for the entire past, o-(t, o-)  EA, Vo-0  EA, Vt E 91. A point o* E A 
is called stationary or a rest  point, if {o-  c  A is an invariant  set. Both A and its 
interior  int(  A) are invariant  in every  regular  selection dynamics.6 
Let F(F)  c A be the set of rest points in a given regular  selection dynamics. 
It is easily verified  that the set F( F)  of all rest points is the same for all SPS 
and all monotonic  selection dynamics  and is given by 
F(F)  = {oC  AjUj(o-_j,si) = Ui(ou), Vsi c  supp(o-i), Vi  c. 
A closed invariant  set A c A is said to be (Lyapunov)  stable,  if the solution 
curves  remain  arbitrarily  close to A for all initial states sufficiently  close to A. 
Formally,  a neighborhood  R of a closed set A c A is an open set containing  A, 
and: 
DEFINITION:  A closed invariant  set A c A is (Lyapunov)  stable, if for every 
neighborhood -7'  of  A  there exists a  neighborhood -7" of  A  such that 
u(t,  uc)  E-'  for all  0. 0 E"  'n  A and all t ? 0. 
A more stringent  stability  notion is that of asymptotic  stability.  It requires  on 
top of (Lyapunov)  stability  that the set A be a local attractor  in the sense that 
all dynamic  paths starting sufficiently  close to  A  converge to  A  over time. 
Formally,  we have the following  definition: 
DEFINITION:  A closed invariant  set A c A is asymptotically  stable if it is stable 
and there exists  some neighborhood  R of A such that o-  (t, o 0)  >t?  A, for all 
0o  E-  n  A.7 
Since any stationary  point o-  E A constitutes a closed subset {o-} of  A, the 
above definitions  also cover stability  notions for points. The induced stability 
criteria  for points coincide with the standard  definitions  (see, e.g., Hirsch and 
Smale (1974, pp. 185)). 
6 Since A is lower-dimensional than the embedding Euclidean space, it has empty interior. But  A 
has a nonempty  relative  interior, denoted  int( A). A subset of  A is called  relatively  interior  if it is a 
subset of int( A). 
7The  notation  o-(t,  u0)  -o  A  is  used  to  mean  minaE Allou(t,  o-?)-all  -t  o000,  where  11H11 
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For a given game F, two player  positions i, j EAX  are said to be symmetric,  if 
Si=Sj  and Ui(s  ij, sk,s)=  U(sj  Ws  si ^s)  Vk,h = 1,...,K=  K., Vs _  eS_  e 
If i and ] are symmetric  player  positions,  then Ui(o-i,  sik) =  U(V-__ s"k),  Vk = 
1,...,  Ki, and Uif(o) = Uj(o-), for all o-  EEA with oi = oj.  Hence, for any AMS 
dynamics  which satisfies wi(o ) = wj(  o-), Vo-  E A, symmetry  of i and j  implies 
that the diagonal D 1 = {v e  AI  oi = oy} is an invariant set (because  o-v  = o-.  vi 
=  6).  If X=  {1,  21 and the two player positions are symmetric,  then (p4%-)  - 
W2(  o)  is simply  a reparametrization  of time which  does not change  the solution 
curves.  So any such AMS dynamics  induces the same orbits as the replicator 
dynamics  on D12 c A1  x A2. This is, for instance, the case for the payoff-nor- 
malized  version of the replicator  dynamics.  Since D12 is isomorphic  with the 
state space of single-population  dynamics  in symmetric  two-player  games, every 
AMS dynamics  with (il  =  W2 induces  the replicator  dynamics  in the correspond- 
ing single-population  dynamics.8 
3.  POINT-WISE STABILITY 
From  the discussion  it is clear that a Nash equilibrium  is a rest point for any 
sign-preserving  or monotonic  selection dynamics  (but not vice versa): E( F) c 
F(F).  But the connection  between  evolutionary  dynamics  and Nash equilibrium 
extends  further.  For monotonic  single-population  selection dynamics  in symmet- 
ric two-player  games it  has been  shown that any (Lyapunov)  stable state 
constitutes  a (symmetric)  Nash equilibrium,  and that convergence  from  an initial 
state in which all pure strategies are present implies that the  limit state 
corresponds  to a (symmetric)  Nash equilibrium  (Nachbar  (1990)).  On the other 
hand, if  a state is  asymptotically  stable in the replicator dynamics,  then it 
corresponds  to an isolated  and (symmetric  trembling-hand)  perfect  Nash equilib- 
rium  (Bomze (1986)). 
These positive results carry  over to multi-population  dynamics  in symmetric 
and asymmetric  n-player  games (Nachbar  (1990), Friedman  (1991), Samuelson 
and Zhang (1992)). Formally:  Call a  state  o-  E A reachable  in  a  selection 
dynamics if there exists o-  '  E int( A) such that o-(t, o 0)  t ?,  o-. It follows from 
continuity  that such a state o0 is stationary  in the selection dynamics  under 
consideration. 
PROPOSITION 1: For any monotonic selection dynamics: 
(a)  If  of E A is Lyapunov stable, then u E E( F). 
(b) If  of E A is reachable, then u E E( F). 
PROOF: See Appendix. 
For predictive  purposes,  however,  these dynamic  properties  appear  too weak. 
8 By single-population dynamics we mean that interacting individuals are drawn from the  same 
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For if a population  state is reachable  but not Lyapunov  stable, then arbitrary 
small perturbations  of the state-by  (unmodeled)  "mutations,"  "mistakes,"  or 
"experiments,"  say-can  lead the population  far away.  Likewise,  if a population 
state is Lyapunov  but not asymptotically  stable, then certain  small shocks  to the 
state will dislocate the population  state permanently  (for a discussion  of the 
related notion of "evolutionary  drift"  see Binmore and Samuelson  (1994)). By 
contrast,  the more stringent  criterion  of asymptotic  stability  does guarantee  a 
"local pull" towards the state (or set) in question. In particular,  asymptotic 
stability  (of a point or set) is preserved  (for some nearby  point or set) even if the 
vector field is slightly  bent inwards  at the boundary  of  A as, for instance, by 
small  amounts  of mutations. 
However, it  has been shown that in the  replicator dynamics  no  interior 
population state is  asymptotically  stable (cf. Amann and Hofbauer (1985); 
Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988, p. 282), Ritzberger and Vogelsberger (1990, 
Lemma  5)). Moreover,  each face of A can be thought  of as a smaller  game of its 
own, derived from F  by deleting all unused pure strategies. The replicator 
dynamics  of such a reduced  game is just the replicator  dynamics  of F restricted 
to the corresponding  face of  A, each face being invariant.  Consequently,  no 
mixed  strategy  combination,  in which at least one player  randomizes,  is asymp- 
totically  stable in the replicator  dynamics. 
This evolutionary  instability  of  mixed equilibria parallels the well known 
"epistemic"  instability of  mixed equilibria in  the  noncooperative  approach 
(Harsanyi  (1973), van Damnme,  (1987, p.  19)): In a mixed equilibrium  some 
player can choose another randomization  than the  one  prescribed by the 
equilibrium,  without  losses of expected  payoff,  given that the other players  stick 
to their equilibrium  strategies.9  If other players  anticipate  this possibility,  then 
they may  want to change their strategies,  etc. 
The  dynamic instability of  interior states can be  shown to  lead to  the 
following  characterization:'0 
PROPOSITION  2:  A  Nash  equilibrium is  asymptotically  stable in  the replicator 
dynamics if and only if it is a strict equilibrium. 
PROOF:  See Appendix. 
It is well known  that the single-population  replicator  dynamics  for symmetric 
two-player  games can have asymptotically  stable rest points which are interior. 
This can happen if, for instance, the diagonal D12 of  A is contained in the 
9Harsanyi,  however, shows that mixed equilibria which satisfy a regularity condition (cf. Harsanyi 
(1973, Lemma 9)) still have a justification as limiting equilibria of games with randomly perturbed 
payoffs as the perturbations approach zero. 
10  Proposition 2 appears as Proposition  1 in Ritzberger and Vogelsberger (1990), and is a slight 
sharpening of  Theorem  4  and Corollary 1 in  Samuelson  and  Zhang  (1992),  for  the  case  of  the 
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convergent  manifold  of an equilibrium  which is a saddle point in the full state 
space A. 
Proposition  2 says that the Nash equilibria  which are asymptotically  stable in 
the multi-population  replicator  dynamics  are precisely those which constitute 
the only best-reply  to a neighborhood  of themselves.  So what are the dynamic 
stability  properties  of equilibria  which are a best-reply  to a neighborhood  of 
themselves,  but not the only one? Such a notion is known  as a robust equilib- 
rium  (Okada  (1983)).  A Nash equilibrium  o- is called robust,  if there exists  some 
neighborhood  & of  o- such that u e  (o- 0)  Vo-0 E & n A. One might, there- 
fore, expect  that for robust  equilibria  the weaker  (Lyapunov)  stability  criterion  is 
satisfied.  This turns out to be true within the class of sign-preserving  selection 
(SPS) dynamics. 
PROPOSITION  3: (a)  Every robust equilibrium is Lyapunov stable in any SPS 
dynamics. 
(b)  For  every robust equilibrium there exists a  neighborhood &  such  that 
o-(t,  cr0)  >t  oo  E()  Fn  ,  Vo0 Ea  n A, in any  AMS dynamics. 
PROOF:  See Appendix. 
4.  BEHAVIOR  CORRESPONDENCES 
Let (  be the class of u.h.c. correspondences-  no  =  xir  oi: A->  S such that 
,13(u) c  po(o-)  for  all  o-  E A (weak inclusion). Correspondences  so c  (  will 
henceforth  be called behavior  correspondences.  For any  correspondence  so:  A -> S, 
and any nonempty  set  A c A, sp(A)  c S denotes the (nonempty)  union of all 
images po(o-)  with o-  cA,  i.e., so(A)= U  E A p(f). 
Let P be the set of all nonempty  product  sets X c S, i.e., X =  E  Xi, where 
0  =A  Xi c Si, Vi E  A.  For any nonempty  set Xi c Si, let  Ai(Xi) be the set of all 
mixed strategies with support in  Xi.  For any X  FP, let  A(X)  =  Xi  4i(Xd). 
This is the face of the polyhedron  A spanned  by X. Such a face  (X)  is itself a 
polyhedron  of mixed  strategy  combinations  associated  with the reduced  game in 
which the pure strategy  set of player i EcK  X  is Xi. 
Basu and Weibull (1991) call a set X E P closed under rational behavior (curb) 
if it contains all its best replies, i.e., if 13(  A(X)) cX,  and call it tight  curb if 
,(( A(X)) =X.  More generally:  given any behavior  correspondence  so e cP, we 
here  call  a  set  Xe  P  closed under (p if  sp(A(X)) cX  and  fixed under  sD  if 
cp(  A(X)) = X."1  Clearly  X E P is a curb  set if it is closed under some behavior 
correspondence  so E (,  by ,(3A(X)) c sp(  A(X)) c X. A set X E P is a minimal 
closed set under so if it is closed under so and contains  no proper  subset  which  is 
closed under sp. 
11  The terminology  is motivated  by the fact that a fixed set for a correspondence  is the direct 
generalization  of a fixed  point of a function,  when the correspondence  is viewed  as a function  from 
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The following  lemma generalizes  some basic properties  of curb sets to sets 
which  are closed under some behavior  correspondence.  The proof follows Basu 
and Weibull  (1991). 
LEMMA  1: (a) If X E P is a minimal closed set under p E  k, then it is a fixed set 
under q'. 
(b)  For every p e  P there exists a minimal closed set. 
(c)  If a singleton set X = {s} is closed under some  'p  c  P, then s E S is a strict 
equilibrium. 
PROOF:  (a) Suppose X E P  is a minimal closed set under 'p E P,  but X O 
(p(A(X)). Then there exists some player i e X  such that 'pj(  A(X)) c  Xi. Let 
Zi =  'op(A(X)), and V]j  i, let  Zj = Xj. Clearly 'o(A(Z)) c  'o(  A(X))  c Z, so X  is 
not minimal-a  contradiction. 
(b) By 'p(A)  c  S  the nonempty collection Q c P  of sets X E P  which are 
closed under some given 'p E  P is finite and partially  ordered  by set inclusion, 
and hence contains  at least one minimal  such set. 
(c)  If a singleton set  X = {s} is closed under  'o c  P, then 0  # ,8(s) c  'p(s) c 
{s}, and so 13(s)  = {s}, i.e., s E S is a strict  equilibrium.  Q.E.D. 
The next result is a key observation  for the subsequent  analysis.  Essentially  it 
provides  a generalization  of a property  of strict  equilibria  which  non-strict  Nash 
equilibria  lack, and which,  in a sense, is the converse  of the defining  property  of 
Nash equilibrium.  While a strategy  combination u e A is defined as a Nash 
equilibrium  whenever  it is contained  in its set of best replies,  {u} C,1(u),  only 
strict equilibria  have the complementary  (curb)  property  of containing  all their 
best replies, 13(u) c {u}. In the first  case unilateral  deviations  are nonprofitable; 
some may be  costly and others costless. In  the  second case all unilateral 
deviations  are costly.  Not surprisingly,  strict equilibria,  therefore,  satisfy  all the 
requirements  for which the refinement  literature  has asked.  In particular,  every 
strict  equilibrium  is pure (a vertex  of A) and it is the unique  best reply  not only 
to itself but, by continuity  of the payoff function,  also to all strategy  combina- 
tions in some neighborhood  of itself. Formally,  if u-  E E(F)  is strict,  then there 
is  some neighborhood W of  u  such that  13(?/nA)c{u}.  Hence, such an 
equilibrium  is robust  to all sufficiently  small  perturbations  of the players'  beliefs 
about each others'  play. 
The following  lemma generalizes  this observation,  first, from the best-reply 
correspondence  to all behavior  correspondences,  and, second, from individual 
strategy  combinations  to sets of strategy  combinations.  As a special case the 
result  holds for all curb sets. (Note that the proof of Lemma  2 relies exclusively 
on the fact that behavior  correspondences  are closed mappings.) 
LEMMA  2:  If X E P is closed under some  'p E  P,  then there exists a neighbor- 
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PROOF: Suppose cp(A(X))  cX  and there is  no neighborhood  Z/ of  A(X) 
such that sp(Z n A) cX.  Let Y be the complement  of X  in S, and identify  X 
and Y with the associated sets of vertices of  A. Then X  and Y are disjoint 
closed subsets of A. By hypothesis,  Y is nonempty  and there exists a sequence 
{o-  T=1  from A converging  to some point o  c- A(X) such that cp(  ) contains 
some point from Y, for all T =  1,2,...  Since so is u.h.c. and Y is closed, this 
implies that also  p(o-  0)  contains  some point from Y. But Y is disjoint  from X 
and hence  sp(uo-) is not a subset of X-a  contradiction.  Q.E.D. 
The next result establishes  basic relationships  between sets which are closed 
under  some behavior  correspondence  and the set of Nash equilibria.  Recall that 
the set E( F)  c  A of Nash equilibria  of any  normal-form  game F is the union of 
finitely  many,  disjoint,  closed and connected sets, called connected  components 
(Kohlberg and Mertens (1986, Proposition 1)). The following observation  is 
trivially  valid for any behavior  correspondence  so c  P: Every  connected  compo- 
nent C c E(F ) is qontained  in the face A(X) spanned  by some set X c P which 
is closed under so (just let X = S). Proposition  4(a) below establishes  the partial 
converse that for any X e P  which is closed under some behavior  correspon- 
dence each connected component  of Nash equilibria  is either disjoint  from or 
contained in the face spanned by X.  Proposition  4(b) shows that every face 
spanned  by a set X c P  which is closed under some behavior  correspondence 
contains a set of Nash equilibria  which satisfies some of the strongest  known 
set-wise refinement  criteria,  essentially  (van Damme (1987, p. 266)), hyperstabil- 
ity, and strategic  stability  (Kohlberg  and Mertens (1986, p. 1022 and p. 1027)). 
Since generic extensive-form  games have only finitely many Nash equilibrium 
outcomes (Kreps and Wilson (1982, Theorem 2)), all strategy  combinations  in 
any connected  set of Nash equilibria  result  in the same outcome  in such games. 
PROPOSITION  4: (a)  If  X c  P  is  closed  under some  behavior correspondence 
(p  c-  and C is a connected component of Nash equilibria, then either C cA(X) 
or C n A(X)  = 0. 
(b)  If X c  P  is  closed  under some  (pc  e  q,  then  A(X)  contains an  essential 
connected component of  Nash  equilibria and,  hence,  a  hyperstable set  and  a 
strategically  stable set of Nash equilibria. 
PROOF: (a) Suppose X c P  is closed under fp  c-  P, and let C c E( F)  be a 
connected  component  of Nash equilibria  such that C n A(X)  # 0.  By Lemma  2 
there exists a neighborhood  Z/ of  A(X) such that  p(?/  n A)  cX.  Suppose C is 
not a subset of  A(X).  Then there exists some o-  I  C  qcn  which does not 
belong to  A(X).  But  f3(uo-)  c  p(o-0) cX,  so o-  0  f 3(uo-),  a contradiction to or? 
being a Nash equilibrium. 
(b) If  Xc  P  is  closed under (p  c- q,  then it  is  closed under 13  e  P, by 
,X3(A(X))  c q'(A(X)) c X. Thus for all o-  c  A(X) and all i c X 
5ik 
0 X.  =>  Ui(o_i,  Si)  <  max Ui(of_i,  I  I  .  I 
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By continuity  (and the maximum  theorem)  there exists a neighborhood  a  of the 
game F=  (S, u) under consideration  in the space of normal-form  games F'  = 
(S, v) such that the above implication  holds for all games in 6.  Consequently, 
for all games F' =  (S, v) c- 6  one has  v3U(A(X))  cX,  i.e., Xc  P  is also closed 
under the best reply correspondence  8v3  of the game F'.  The reduced game 
Fx = (X, u), where players  are restricted  to the strategy  spaces Xi, Vi EA,  has 
an  essential component of  Nash equilibria Cx  c  E(Fx)  (cf.  Kohlberg and 
Mertens  (1986, Proposition  1)). In other words:  For every e > 0 there exists a 
neighborhood  Ax  of  Fx = (X, u)  such  that  for  every F4 = (X, v) C &I  there 
exists some o' c E(F4)  within distance e  from Cx c A(X) (in the Hausdorff 
metric).  Then 
&--= {F'  = (S,v)  e6"IF4=  (X,v)  e6"&} 
defines  a neighborhood  of  F=  (S, u), and any F'  =  (S, v) c  6E  has some o'  c 
E(F4)  within  distance  e  from  Cx.  But,  since  F' c- 6,  8v(A(X))  cX  and so 
c' c E(F').  Moreover,  83u(A(X))  cX  implies Cx C E(F),  so Cx is an essential 
component  for the game F.  Every essential component  contains  a hyperstable 
set, and every hyperstable  set contains a strategically  stable set by standard 
arguments  (cf. Kohlberg  and Mertens  (1986,  p. 1022)).  Q.E.D. 
An important  role in the analysis  below will be played by the "better-reply" 
correspondence  y =  xi  ,r  yi:  A -*  S, defined  by 
Yi(o-)  ={Si  E  silui(o-i,  Si)  2Uj(or)},  Vlic-X. 
Evidently y  is  u.h.c. and  gi(o-) c yi(o-) for all players i c-A  and strategy 
combinations  o-  c A, so y is a behavior  correspondence. 
In other words: yi  assigns to each strategy  combination o-  c  A those pure 
strategies  si which  give at least the same payoff  as o-1.  Such  strategies  si are thus 
(weakly)  better  replies to o, than o-i is. Moreover,  yi(o-) always  contains  some 
pure strategy  from the support  of o-1.  In particular,  if o- is a Nash equilibrium, 
then yi(o-) contains  the whole support  of o-1,  and indeed one then has y(o)  = 
,8(o-).  As a consequence,  a singleton  set X=  {s} is closed under  y if and only if 
s c S  is  a  strict equilibrium.  More generally, this is  true for all behavior 
correspondences  the  images of  which are contained in  the  images of  the 
"better-reply"  correspondence: 
COROLLARY  1: If (p  c-  P is such that (p(o-) c  y(o),  Vo-  c  , then a singleton  set 
X = {s} c  P is closed under (p if and only if s c  S is a strict equilibrium. 
PROOF:  Lemma  l(c) covers  the "only  if ' part.  If o c- A is a strict  equilibrium, 
then  a-  = s  is pure and  ,3(s) = y(s)  = {s}. Thus  p(s) = {s} for all  fp  c-  P which 
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5.  SET-WISE  STABILITY 
We are now in a position  to establish  a characterization  of asymptotic  stability 
of faces of the polyhedron  A of mixed  strategy  combinations,  a characterization 
based exclusively  on the data of the game under  consideration.  By applying  this 
characterization  no detailed  information  on the dynamics  is needed in order to 
judge  whether  a given  face is asymptotically  stable or not; it is sufficient  that the 
dynamics  meets the conditions  of a sign-preserving  selection (SPS)  dynamics.  In 
particular,  the class of asymptotically  stable faces agrees for all such dynamics. 
THEOREM  1: For any SPS  dynamics and  any set X  FP: The face  A(X)  is 
asymptotically  stable if and only if X is closed under y. 
PROOF:  Suppose  first y(A(X)) cX.  Then there is some neighborhood  SR of 
A(X) such that y(C  n A) cX,  by Lemma  2. There exists some e > 0 such that 
_W  contains the "e-slice" (s)  = {o-  c  linf: E A(X)  II  cr -  <f  11  s}.  For any player 
i EiX, let Yi be the complement  to Xi in Si and consider any SPS dynamics 
= ukf k(u',  V=  K.Ve4  If  iu(t0)  -Ai(X.) =Ai,  (IT  =  ir,  Vk =,.,Ki,  Vi cX.  If  Yi is empty, oi(t, 
Vo-0  e?  , AVt. Otherwise,  for every  S5k  C Yi and cr  c-(e)  we have Ui(ori  , s k) < 
Ui(o),  since y(m(e))  cX.  But this implies  j- k <0,  for all  c(E)  with 
Fik  > 0.  Hence  oik(t,  or?)  u 
?,  Vo-  E(e),  implying oi(t  ?) tO,  Ai(Xi). 
In order  to establish  the Lyapunov  stability  property  of A(X): For any  neighbor- 
hood  M', let the neighborhood  M" be such that  M"  n A is an e'-slice  MW') c 
ml n A, and apply  the above argument.  This proves  the "if' part. 
Second, assume X  is  not closed under -y  E '.  Then there is some pure 
strategy  combination  s eX,  player i e AX  and pure strategy  sk 0 Xi  such that 
Li(Ks_Sk)>2  Ui(s-), since  otherwise  Ui(s-i,  s)  -  Ui(s)  < 0, Vs EX,  Vi Ec4,  and 
Vs'E Si \  Xi, which would imply Ui(ocri,  s') -  Ui(oc) < 0, Vo1  EA (X),  Vi E-A, 
and Vs' E Si \  Xi, which is equivalent to  X  being closed under y. Let s* = 
(s_ ,s  s),  and let  X*  E P  be defined by X7  = {9},  Vj 0 i, and Xi* =  {gi,  sik},  i.e., 
A(X*) is the one-dimensional  face (or edge) spanned  by the two pure strategy 
combinations  s  and  s*.  Moreover,  Ui(s*) -  Ui(g) 2 0, and since  Ui is linear in 
oi, Ui(o_,  si)  -S  i(o)  ?  0, Vo e A(X*). Clearly A(X*)  is invariant under any 
SPS dynamics. Hence, for any initial state  o  E A(X*)  the  solution path 
through o-0  has  6rk2O,  in any SPS dynamics, implying that  o-(t, o-  0) does  not 
approach  A(X)  as  t -*  oo. The  two faces  A(X*)  and  A(X)  having the  point 
cr= s in common  implies  that A(X) is not asymptotically  stable.  Q.E.D. 
REMARK  1: Suppose  X E P is closed under y and consider  an AMS dynamics 
with  player-specific  "shift-factors"  1i,  i E A'.  For every  i E  XAand  sEi- Yi  = Si \ Xi 
let 
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where  (s)  is the "e-slice"  as in the proof of the Theorem.  Since y(A(X)) cX, 
it follows  for e > 0 sufficiently  small  that 8ik > 0. Therefore,  i<  -  8ikcoikk which 
implies that ur-k(t)  <  o-.k(O)exp{  - aikt},  V-(O) Em(e),  Vt  2  0. In this sense the 
weights  assigned  to pure strategies  outside the set X converge  to zero exponen- 
tially in any AMS dynamics. 
REMARK  2: Consider a  symmetric two-player game.  Let  (o-1) =  {s1 E 
S1 U1(sj,  o-1)  2  Ul(o-1,  o-1)} and for any X1 c S1 let j (A1(X1)) =  U al  A  1(X)1). 
The same arguments  as in the first  part of the proof of Theorem 1 can be used 
to show that if X1 c S1 satisfies 5(A1(X1))  c X1 then A1(Xl) is asymptotically 
stable in any single-population  sign-preserving  selection dynamics. 
One readily verifies, by the argument  in the second part of the proof of 
Theorem 1,  that if  X c P  is  not  closed under y,  then  A(X)  cannot be 
asymptotically  stable  in  any  monotonic  selection  dynamics  either  (because 
U(9-i,  sk)  >  U(s),  gi = si,  implies  f.k(u)>fh(u)  VoC z(X*),  by  Vo=(s,v), 
Vo-  c  A(X*), from monotonicity). 
The other implication of Theorem 1 also generalizes to  a wider class of 
dynamics. Suppose  the  dynamics is  of  the  form  6ik=  ik(u),  Vk =  1,...,  Ki, 
Vi E=/,  for some Lipschitz  continuous functions (i: A ->  t  Ki,  Vi  EX,  which 
leave A, but not necessarily  all faces; positively  invariant,  and the dynamics  is 
weakly  sign-preserving  (WSP) in the sense 
kif-et)  <  Ui(O-) 
(: 
ik(O-)  <  ?,  VSt  E-  SUpp(0-,FS  i (o0- , Si)U()  I)O  iseup(),  Vo-E=A, 
for all i E  A4'.  Such  WSP  dynamics  can be of interest  when, due to mutations,  say, 
the vector field (  points inwards  at the boundary  of A. Applying  the argument 
in the first  part of the proof of Theorem 1, closure under y implies asymptotic 
stability  in any WSP dynamics. 
COROLLARY 2: (a) If the face  A(X)  is asymptotically  stable in some monotonic 
selection dynamics, then X is closed under y. 
(b)  If X E P is closed under y,  then A(X)  is asymptotically  stable in any WSP 
dynamics. 
In view of Lemma  l(a) Theorem  1 implies  that a set X E P is fixed under  y if 
and only if the associated  face A(X) is a minimal  asymptotically  stable face of 
the polyhedron A, in any SPS dynamics.  Furthermore,  since a pure strategy 
combination s E S, viewed as a singleton set, is fixed under the better-reply 
correspondence  if and only if it is a strict  equilibrium  (Corollary  1), Theorem 1 
also implies  the following  characterization  of asymptotically  stable pure strategy 
combinations: 
COROLLARY 3:  For any SPS dynamics: A pure strategy  combination is asymptot- 
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Combining  Theorem 1 with Proposition  4(b) yields that any face which is 
asymptotically  stable in some SPS dynamics  contains  a closed and connected  set 
of Nash equilibria  which is essential, contains a hyperstable  set, and hence a 
strategically  stable set in the sense of Kohlberg  and Mertens  (1986): 
COROLLARY  4: If a face A(X) is asymptotically  stable  in some SPS dynamics, 
then it contains an  essential component  of  Nash equilibria,  and thus also a 
hyperstable  and a strategically  stable  set. 
In the sense of set inclusion  there is thus a link between asymptotic  stability 
in evolutionary  dynamics  and strategic  stability.  The converse of Corollary  4 is 
trivial:  Any strategically  stable set, or essential  component  of Nash equilibria,  is 
contained  in some (minimal)  face spanned  by a set X E P which  is closed under 
the better-reply  correspondence. 
As mentioned  inthe introduction,  the claim  that an asymptotically  stable face 
of  A contains a hyperstable  subset also follows from Theorem 1 of Swinkels 
(1993).  His result states that if a closed set A c A is (i) asymptotically  stable in 
some myopic  adjustment  dynamics,  a class which  includes  all SPS dynamics,  and 
(ii) has a basin of attraction  which contains  a (relative)  neighborhood  of A the 
closure  of which  is homeomorphic  to A, then A contains  a hyperstable  subset.'2 
The topological  condition  (ii) is clearly  met by all asymptotically  stable faces of 
A. Since a set is hyperstable  (roughly)  if it is minimal  with respect  to essentiality 
(cf. Kohlberg and Mertens (1986, p.  1022)), Corollary 4  also follows from 
Swinkels'  result. 
The hypothesis  in Corollary  4 and in Swinkels'  result,  asymptotic  stability  of a 
given set, may, however,  often be hard to verify.  In such a case Theorem 1 is 
helpful,  because  it provides  an operational  necessary  and sufficient  condition  for 
asymptotic  stability,  at least for a certain class of subsets of  A and selection 
dynamics. 
This raises the following  issue: Which (closed) subsets of  A, other than its 
faces, are asymptotically  stable in which class of selection dynamics?  There is a 
trade-off  here between the precision  of evolutionary  predictions,  in the sense of 
"small"  asymptotically  stable sets, and the robustness  of those predictions  with 
respect  to the dynamics.  In many  applications  only broad  qualitative  features  of 
the dynamics  are known  or assumed.  So a fair amount  of robustness  of stability 
properties  with respect  to the details of the dynamics  seems desirable.  But such 
a  robustness with respect to  a  subclass of  selection dynamics may require 
relatively  "large"  sets. 
In particular,  it turns out that even a subclass of SPS dynamics,  the AMS 
dynamics,  is rich enough to disqualify  all (closed) sets which belong to the 
12 Swinkels  (1993)  calls  a regular  dynamics  a myopic  adjustment  dynamics  if all Nash  equilibria  are 
rest points and Ek  ikfik(oy)Ui(o__,  sik) > 0 holds, Vo Ee  A, Vi E.4X.  It is not difficult  to see that any 
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relative  interior  of any of the faces of A.3  No such set can even be (Lyapunov) 
stable in all AMS dynamics,  unless the relevant face consists entirely of rest 
points for all SPS and monotonic  selection dynamics.  Hence, one can disregard 
all relatively  interior  (closed) sets if one requires  predictions  to be robust  across 
the class of AMS dynamics. 
PROPOSITION  5:  If a closed set A c int(A(X)), for some X e P,  is (Lyapunov) 
stable in all AMS dynamics, then A(X)  c F( F). 
PROOF: See Appendix. 
An alternative  robustness  test is to require  that the subsets under considera- 
tion be asymptotically  stable in the benchmark  case of the replicator  dynamics. 
However, as pointed out  in  Section 3,  no  interior strategy combination  is 
asymptotically  stable in the replicator  dynamics.  The generalization  of this claim 
to (relatively)  interior  closed sets is immediate.  Therefore,  to require  asymptotic 
stability  in the replicator  dynamics  again  discards  (relatively)  interior  closed sets. 
PROPOSITION  6:  No closed set in the (relative) interior  of a face is asymptotically 
stable in the replicator  dynamics. 
PROOF: See Appendix. 
Clearly,  when precise information  on the dynamics  is available,  it is possible 
in some games  to identify  proper  subsets  of asymptotically  stable  faces which  are 
themselves  asymptotically  stable or at least (Lyapunov)  stable in that dynamics. 
This is the case, for instance,  with the "matching  pennies"  game for which the 
solution paths to the replicator  dynamics  are closed orbits around the Nash 
equilibrium  point. Although  its unique  (interior)  Nash equilibrium  constitutes  a 
strategically  stable singleton  set, the only subset  of A which  is (Lyapunov)  stable 
in  all  AMS dynamics is  A  itself. In  fact, in  this game the  unique Nash 
equilibrium  outcome is dynamically  unstable in certain AMS dynamics  which 
are arbitrarily  close to the replicator  dynamics  (see the proof of Proposition  5 in 
the Appendix).  Hence, in this sense, its (Lyapunov)  stability  in the replicator 
dynamics  is not even locally  robust  in the space of AMS dynamics. 
Another difference between strategic and evolutionary  dynamic  stability is 
that, though  also some strategically  stable sets may induce  several  outcomes  (cf. 
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986, Figure 11)), for generic extensive-form  games 
there exists at least one strategically  stable set which induces  a single outcome. 
However,  as seen in the "matching  pennies"  game, a face which is asymptoti- 
cally stable in all SPS dynamics  need not correspond  to a unique  outcome,  even 
if the face contains a strategically  stable set which induces a single outcome. 
13  As with  A, the relative interior of a face  A(X)  is denoted by int( A(X)).  A subset  A c A(X)  is 
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Hence, evolutionary  processes  may  result in paths along  which  also the outcome 
persistently  oscillates,  even in nondegenerate  games.  For, while in a completely 
mixed  Nash equilibrium  each player  is indifferent  between all her pure strate- 
gies, she is required  to randomize  in a particular  fashion in order to keep the 
other players  "in equilibrium."  In an evolutionary  setting,  however,  there is no 
outside coordination  mechanism,  and individuals  now and then change strategy 
in the light of little information.  In particular,  they need not know the payoffs 
associated  with other player  positions.  Therefore,  there is a priori  nothing  there 
to "bring  them to order." 
6.  EXAMPLES 
EXAMPLE  1: Figure 1 shows the (reduced) normal form of a game where 
player 1 first chooses whether  to take an outside option (sl)  or to move into a 
2 x 2 subgame of the "battle-of-the-sexes"  type that consists of the last two 
strategies  for both players  (van Damme (1989, Figure 1)). The game has two 
components  of Nash equilibria,  both of which contain  subgame  perfect equilib- 
ria: In the first component  player 1 chooses her outside option and player 2 
plays  her first  pure strategy  with probability  at least 1/3  (o-1h  = 1,1/3  < o-  2  1). 
The second component  is the strict equilibrium,  oQ2  = cr  2 =1.  The first compo- 
nent does not contain a strategically  stable set nor an equilibrium  that satisfies 
forward  induction  in the sense of van Damme (1989, p. 485). 
The game has three curb sets, S, X= {s2}  X  {52},  and Y= {s1,  2}2X {s  , s2}, 
but only S and X are closed under -y.  By Theorem  1 the (singleton)  set X which 
induces the strategically  stable outcome and satisfies  forward  induction  in the 
sense of van Damme is the only asymptotically  stable face (except for the full 
strategy  set) in this game, for any SPS dynamics. 
s1  s2  S2  S2 
2  2 
S1  5 
S2  0  3 
1  So  1 
Si  3  1  0 
3 Si  3  0 
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EXAMPLE  2: Figure 2 shows the normal  form of the "beer-quiche"  signaling 
game due to David Kreps  (Kohlberg  and Mertens  (1986, Figure  14, p. 1031);  cf. 
also Cho and Kreps  (1987,  Figure  1)). In this game,  player  1 observes  a choice by 
nature assigning  a type to her, "strong"  with probability  0.9 and "weak"  with 
probability  0.1. Then she sends either a "strong"  or a "weak"  signal. Upon 
seeing the signal, player 2 decides whether to retreat or fight. Normal form 
strategies  correspond  to the following  choices:  Player  1 can either always  send a 
"strong"  signal (sl),  or send a "strong"  signal when she is strong and send a 
"weak"  signal  when she is weak  (S2),  or send a "weak"  signal  when she is strong 
and send a "strong"  signal  when she is weak (se), or always  send a weak signal 
(s4).  Player 2 can either retreat upon seeing a "strong"  signal and fight upon 
seeing a "weak"  signal (sl), or always  retreat  (s2),  or always  fight  (S3),  or fight 
-upon  seeing a "strong"  signal  and retreat  upon seeing a "weak"  signal  (s4).  The 
game has two connected components  of Nash equilibria.  In the first, "good" 
component  player 1 always  sends a "strong"  signal and player 2 retreats  upon 
seeing a "strong"  signal but fights  with probability  at least 1/2  upon seeing a 
"'weak"  signal (o-1I  = 1, o-1  +  o-22  =  1, o-2 2  1/2).  In the second, "bad" compo- 
nent player  1 always  sends a "weak"  signal and player  2 retreats  upon seeing a 
"weak"  signal but fights with probability  at least 1/2  upon seeing a "strong" 
signal  (o- 4  =  1,  o22  +  -24 =  1,  24 2 1/2). 
The only set Ye P which spans a face containing  the second, "bad"  compo- 
nent and  which  is closed under  y is the whole strategy  set S. On the other hand, 
the  first, '"good"  component is  contained in  the  face  spanned be  the  set 
X =  {s,  s  }  X  {sW,  s2}  E P,  i.e., the set where player 1 either always sends a 
"strong"  signal or sends a "strong"  signal when she is strong and a "weak" 
signal when she is weak, and player 2 either retreats upon seeing a "strong" 
signal and fights upon seeing a "weak" signal or always retreats. From the EVOLUTIONARY  SELECTION  1391 
payoffs in Figure 2 it is easy to verify that the set  X  is closed under the 
better-reply  correspondence  and, in fact, is a fixed set both under y and P3.  So, 
in this example closure under -y selects the strategy  subset that contains the 
"intuitive"  pure strategies. 
EXAMPLE 3: The payoff bi-matrix  in Figure 3 shows a two-player  game with 
three strategies  for each player. The game has three Nash equilibria,  one of 
which (in the lower right corner)  is strict.  The other two are mixed,  one being 
the equilibrium  of the "matching-pennies"  game that consists of the first two 
strategies  for each player.  Whether  the set X = {s1, s 2} x  {s1, s2} is closed under 
y depends  on the parameter  x. If x is negative,  then the set X is closed under 
y, otherwise  not. However,  for all x < 2 the X is closed under P. If x ?  0, then 
by Theorem 1 the face A(X) is not asymptotically  stable in any SPS dynamics. 
Figure  4 illustrates  some computer  simulations  of solution paths to the replica- 
tor dynamics starting near  A(X)  and converging to  the  strict equilibrium 
S =  (s3,  s3).  Here x = 1.9, so X  is closed under ,.  In the diagram  pj, resp. qj, 
denote the population shares using the jth  pure strategy,  for j = 1,2,3,  for 
player  roles 1, resp. 2. Note that the restriction  of this game to mixed-strategy 
profiles  in the face A(X) is, by itself, a constant-sum  game  with  value 1 -  x/2.  If 
x is negative,  then X is closed under y, and the constant-sum  "subgame"  has its 
own domain  of attraction,  just like a strict  equilibrium.  (In fact, the game then is 
a kind of generalized  coordination  game.) 
EXAMPLE 4: As a final example,  consider  the three-player  3 X 2 x 2 game of 
Figure  5, in which  player  1 chooses tri-matrix,  player  2 row,  and player  3 column. 
For any fixed  pure strategy  of the first  player,  players  2 and 3 face a symmetric 
2 x 2 game. When player 1 uses her first strategy  (sl),  the first strategies of 
players 2 and 3 (sl  and s',  respectively)  are strictly dominant.  However, if 
players  2 and 3 would  use those strategies,  then player  l's best reply  is to switch 
to her second strategy  (s2).  But when player 1 uses her second strategy,  the 
1  52  s3 
2  x  0 
S1  -x  2  0 
s2  x  2  0 
2  -x  0 
0  0  1 
S3  0  0  1 
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second  strategies  of players  2 and 3 (s2 and S3)  are strictly  dominant,  and if they 
would  use these, player  l's best reply  is her first  strategy.  When  player  1 uses her 
third  strategy  (s3), finally,  players  2 and 3 face a game of pure coordination. 
It  is  not  difficult  to  show  that  the  product  set  X = {s,  sXS2XS3EP 
obtained  by taking  all players'  first  two strategies  constitutes  (the maximal)  curb 
set, i.e., it is closed under p3.  But one can show that the excluded  strategy,  s3, is 
not strictly  dominated.  Hence, it is a priori possible that the population  share 
using  strategy  s3 does not tend to zero along some interior  solution  paths.  If this 
is the case even for (interior)  trajectories  starting  arbitrarily  close to the face 
spanned  by X, then a set closed under ,B need not even attract  a neighborhood. 
Indeed, computer  simulations  produce  precisely  such trajectories;  see Figure 
6 for solution orbits to the replicator  dynamics.  Since players  2 and 3 always EVOLUTIONARY  SELECTION  1393 
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earn identical  payoffs,  the diagonal o-2  =  o-3  is invariant.  The diagram  shows a 
solution curve for which initially u1(0)  =  (0.05,0.90,0.05), and  or2(0) =  ur3(0) = 
(0.15,0.85),  plotted in three-dimensional  space  with orj on the "horizontal"  axis, 
oa2 on the "vertical"  axis, and o21  =  o31  on the "depth"  axis.  The face spanned 
by X is the sloping  square.  As one sees in this diagram,  after a few initial  rounds 
the solution curve swirls  out towards  a perpetual  motion near the edges of the 
polyhedron,  recurrently  moving  virtually  as far away  from  the face spanned  by X 
as it is possible.14  So one peculiar  feature of this example  is that outcomes do 
not converge.  The only trajectories  that can be shown to converge  to the face 
spanned  by X are those starting  in the straight  line segment L = {o-  GE  A o21 = 
o-31  = 1/2, o-1  =  o- }.  This set is invariant  and intersects  the face spanned  by X 
at its mid-point,  a Nash equilibrium  which constitutes  a (singleton)  strategically 
stable set in the sense of Kohlberg  and Mertens  (1986). 
This illustrates  why evolutionary  predictions  may  have to be less precise  than, 
say,  strategically  stable sets of Nash equilibria  are. All interior  trajectories  which 
do not start in L will move outwards  towards  the edges of the polyhedron,  but 
they will never come to a halt. Rather each such trajectory  will visit each of the 
six vertices infinitely  often. Since L  is lower-dimensional  than the polyhedron 
shown in Figure 6, a prediction  that concentrates  on the Nash equilibrium  will 
ignore  the most likely results  of evolution. 
14 The phenomenon  illustrated  by Figure  6 is known  as a "heteroclinic  cycle"  in the theory  of 
dynamical  systems  (cf. Sigmund  (1992),  Gaunersdorfer  (1992)). 1394  K.  RITZBERGER AND  J.  W.  WEIBULL 
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7.  DIRECTIONS FOR  FURTHER  RESEARCH 
The results  in the present  paper suggest  that set-wise  criteria  such as closure 
under a behavior  correspondence  may have stronger  implications  for dynamic 
evolutionary  selection than the  Nash equilibrium  property has. This raises 
several further issues. Are similar  methods capable of identifying  faces which 
meet weaker  stability  criteria?  Can the approach  be generalized  to a wider  class 
of sets and/or dynamics  (cf. Swinkels  (1993))?  For which classes of games do 
dynamic evolutionary  approaches  have strong cutting power? Can a similar 
approach  be applied  to the extensive  form  of the game (Noldeke  and Samuelson 
(1993))?  Finally,  deterministic  selection dynamics  in continuous  time constitute 
only one possible formalization  of evolutionary  processes.  It would be of great 
interest  to explore  the relation  of closure  under  a behavior  correspondence  and, EVOLUTIONARY  SELECTION  1395 
say, attractors  in stochastic  adaption  processes  for finite populations  (see, e.g., 
Hurkens (1994)). 
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APPENDIX 
PROOF  OF  PROPOSITION  1: (a) Every Lyapunov  stable state must be  a rest point. Consider 
a eF(F)  \  E(F).  There is some i E=Xand  s5 0  supp(i)  such that Ui(o- j, sr) > Ui(o),  and hence 
fik(cy)  >f1h(cr)  = 0,  Vsi  E supp(oi),  by monotonicity and stationarity. By continuity of  fi  there is a 
neighborhood  a'  of  oa such that fik(&') > 0, Val' E 6'  rl A. But this implies that  ojk(t,  U,) is strictly 
increasing  in t, whenever  ; E E  n  A, 5ik  >  0,  and o(t,  53)  E 6'.  Hence, either oIk(t,  53)  increases 
forever, or o(t,  v3) q a'  for some  t > 0. In both cases  oa is not Lyapunov stable, because  o-ik = O. 
(b)  Suppose  a'  E int(A)  and  a (t, a 0)  a  oo. Then  af E F(F).  If  a  o  E(F),  then, as in the 
proof  of  (a),  there  is  i EA',  s5  0  supp(ai),  and  a  neighborhood  a  of  oa  such  that  f/k(o')  >0, 
Vo' ec'n  A. Convergence of  a-(t,  ao)  to  oa implies that there is some T>  0 such that o(t,  ao)  E 
n int(A), Vt 2  T, because int(A) is invariant. But convergence to  oa and  Sik  =  0 imply that there is 
some t > T such that  6ik  < O,  which contradicts fik(o')  >  0, Val' c  a  n  .  Hence,  o- c  E(F).  Q.E.D. 
PROOF  OF  PROPOSITION  2: Results  in Sections  4 and  5 do not rely  on Proposition  2 and can thus 
be used here. 
(i)  First assume that  5f E E(F  ) is asymptotically stable in the replicator equation. By Proposition 
6 it must then be pure and by Corollary 3 it must be a strict equilibrium. 
(ii)  If  5; E E( F ) is a strict equilibrium, then it is asymptotically stable by Corollary 3.  Q.E.D. 
PROOF  OF  PROPOSITION  3: (a)  Assume  that  there  exists  a  neighborhood  a  of  a  such  that 
fEc  fi(a 0),  Va  IEn  A. Choose  e1' c a  to be  a neighborhood of  5f  such that  I' n A is convex 
and  ik >  0 =:ik  >  0,  Vo C-  '  n A,  Vk =1.  Ki,  Vi Ec  . Define  the  function  V.:  At  nA-KR 
by 
Kg 
V#J(ff)  =-  Et  Et  Ck  on(ik)  2 0, 
ieAt  k=  1 
which is continuously differentiable on  b". By Jensen's inequality,  a- 0 53 implies 
Iva-a  n(a  aik  >  -  E  In(  E  -k  )  =0, 
ie  k=  i  k=1  5i 
so  av= 5f is the unique minimum of  V,. 
Taking the time derivative of  V., yields 
d  Ki 
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because  Uik  > 0 =*  si  E  3(cr),  Vca  E e1' n A, hence Ui(o- i,si)  2  UL(of),  which  by.  the definition  of SPS 
dynamics  implies fik(f)>  0,  Vsk E supp(f),  Vi EAX. Hence, V.  is  a local Lyapunov  function, 
implying  that ff  is a stable  rest point for any SPS dynamics. 
(b) If the SPS dynamics  is specialized  to an AMS dynamics,  then from  robustness  it follows  now 
that J'(of)  = 0 implies  Ui(o- j, vi) = UL(of),  Vi EtX,  such  that ao- i3(o), and  hence ac-E(F).  Thus 
VI'(o) < 0 for all acrEe  ' n A which  satisfy  aoE(F).  Therefore,  a (t, a 0) ,  E(F)  nfl',  vc  c0E 
6"' n A, as required.  Q.E.D. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION  5: Since each face of A is invariant  in every  regular  selection  dynamics, 
and  the restriction  of such a dynamics  to any  face is a regular  selection  dynamics  with  respect  to the 
associated  reduced  game,  we may  assume  without  loss of generality  that X = S. 
Consider  an AMS dynamics ik =fC(cy)ci  k  and call the "shift-factors"  w1)i  from  the representa- 
tion of  AMS dynamics  given in  Section 2.2  payoff increasing  if  there exists a  continuously 
differentiable  function gi: Ji  -*  Ti++ with positive  derivative,  g' > 0, such that w1i(o) =g  i(a)), 
Vo E A. 
CLAIM  1: If a closed set A c int(A) with nonempty  interior  is positively  invariant  in an AMS 
dynamics  with payoff  increasing  "shift-factors"  cwi,  Vi e A, then A = F(F): 
Define the vector  field ; on int(A) by 
where  P(c)  =  HI  rI (Th 
for all k =  1.  Ki, Vi e A.  Because P(-)  > 0 on int(A), multiplying  the vector field associated 
with the AMS dynamics  by P(u)-  1 does not alter the solution curves  of the AMS dynamics  in 
int(A). Thus the differential  equation &= {(uo) has the same rest points and the same stability 
properties  on int(  A) as the original  AMS dynamics.  Henceforth  let  ^(t, a')  denote a solution  to 
&=  {(of)  through  a'  =  a(0,  ar0) E int(A). 
Define  the directional  derivative,  at some point ai E int(Ai),  of a differentiable  function  g: int(Ai) 
-i  in the direction  towards  a vertex s5  of Ai by 
dg(ij,  Si)  =  kg  -  i  -  grad(g(ai)). 
If wi is differentiable,  Vi E A, by the explicit  representation  of AMS dynamics  one obtains 
dik(a,  sk)  UP(crY'[coi(cr)(K  -2)[L1(cr_,sf) 
+j  vi[if_i,S~)  Ui(o-)]dc)i(o,  s/)]. 
The divergence  of a vector  field is the trace  of its Jacobian,  so 
Ki 
div;(o-) =P(o)-  ,  ,  o[,ss)  - 
ieAX k= 1 
at any oa  E int(  A). If the player-specific  "shift-factors"  wi are payoff  increasing,  then 
Ki 
div;(uf) =P(uf)  gi(Uj(uf))  ,  [Ui(uf_i,s  S) -Ui(af)]  2vi  k2  0, 
-<X  k=1 
for all a-  c  int(A). Clearly,  div (cr) > 0, Va  cE int(A) \  F(F),  and div (cr) = 0, Va c- int(A) n F(F). 
Suppose  the closed set A c int(A) with int(A) $ 0  is positively  invariant  in the AMS dynamics 
with payoff  increasing  "shift-factors."  Assign  to A the volume VO  = JA  do > 0, because  int(A) # 0, 
define  A(t)  = {acE  ala=  a(t,  a0),  a?0  EA}  and  V(t) = JA(t)d a.  If  A  is  positively invariant, then 
A(t) cA  c int(A), Vt 2 0. By Liouville's  theorem  (see, e.g., Hofbauer  and Sigmund  (1988,  pp. 170, EVOLUTIONARY  SELECTION  1397 
281))  the volume  V(t) of A(t) satisfies 
V(t)=f  div;(u)dcv?0,  Vt?0. 
A(t) 
Therefore,  V(t) 2 VO,  > 0, Vt 2 0. But, because A is positively  invariant,  also VO  2 V(t), Vt 2 0, such 
that V(t) = 0, Vt ? 0. Hence  VO  = JA  n F(r) da,  since div  (u)  > 0, Va  cEA \  F(F).  Because  VO  > 0, 
it follows  that A n FFr)  must  contain  an open set (with  strictly  positive  volume).  However,  FFr)  is 
the set of zeros  of the replicator  equation  (the AMS dynamics  with wiF(a)  = 1, Vao  e  A, Vi e v)  and, 
therefore,  the set of solutions  of a polynomial  equation.  A system  of polynomial  equations  which 
vanishes  on an open nonempty  set vanishes  everywhere  and, consequently,  F(F)  = A. This estab- 
lishes Claim  1. 
CLAIM  2: If a closed set A c int(A) is (Lyapunov)  stable in all AMS dynamics,  then A =F(): 
If the closed set A c int(A) is (Lyapunov)  stable in all AMS dynamics,  then it must  be stable  in 
an AMS  dynamics  with  payoff  increasing  "shift-factors."  By definition,  for every  neighborhood  .V'  of 
A there exists a neighborhood  .V"  of  A  such that 
W(t) =  {acEAlaj=  a (t, acv),  oc"  E."  fn A) ca',  Vt>  0, 
where ao(t, a?v)  denotes the solution to an AMS dynamics  with payoff increasing  "shift-factors." 
Choose  .0  such  that closure  (a' n A) c int(A) and define 0.O  =  U,>  0.2o(t).  Then B  closure(C?F) 
c int(A)  and  R0O  is  a  (relative)  neighborhood  of  A,  because  for  every  t  0  the  set  W(t)  is 
(relatively)  open as the image  of the (relatively)  open set .0"  n A under  the continuous  one-to-one 
mapping a ,-* a(t,  a),  and  0.O is (relatively) open  as the union of (relatively) open  sets  .V(t),  and 
A c.S.  by construction.  But  0.O  is positively  invariant  as the union of (forward)  orbits.  Since with 
.S.  also its closure  B is positively  invariant,  B is a closed  set with  nonempty  (relative)  interior  which 
is  contained in  int(  A) and positively invariant  in  the AMS dynamics  with payoff increasing 
"shift-factors."  Consequently,  Claim  1 implies  A =  F(F).  Q.E.D. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION  6: Again  we may assume  without  loss of generality  A(X) =  A. Consider 
the replicator  dynamics,  i.e., the AMS dynamics  with wi(a) = 1, Va E A, Vi E  A.  Define the vector 
field ; on int(A) as in the proof  of Proposition  5 by multiplying  the vector  field associated  with the 
replicator  dynamics  by P(a)1.  Then dwj(u,  ssk)  = 0, Voe  EA, Vsi Ec  Si, Vi ECA', implies  div (o)  = 0, 
Va E int(A). If a compact  set A c int(A) is asymptotically  stable  in the replicator  dynamics,  then it is 
so for a  = ;(o-).  Denote by a(t, a ?) a solution to  a = ;(oa)  with a(0, o"  ?) = a ? E int(A). Let 
.-V  c int(A) be a relative neighborhood  of  A  with compact  closure !W  c A such that acvE  = 
a(t,  a ?) -*  co  A. Define  '(t) = {a Eial a = a(t,  a ?), a ?0  Ei.).  Assign to  .V  volume V(0) =  Jw  du 
> 0 and to A  volume VO  = JA do-. 
Suppose for some ?> 0 there exists no  finite time after which .?(t)  is within (Hausdorff) 
distance ? from A  and remains there. Then there exists an increasing  sequence {tk}.k=  I with 
tk  k  W  oo + 00  and initial states  {a  k}=  1  'k  Ej,V  k,  such that the  (Hausdorff) distance between 
cv(tk,  cvk)  and A  is at least ?,  for all k. Since !T is compact,  the sequence  {cv}k)=  contains  a 
convergent  subsequence,  so we can assume that it converges  to  a * Ei..  By the hypothesis  of 
asymptotic  stability  the distance  from c(tk,  a* ) to A converges  to zero.  Thus  there is some k' such 
that ac(tk, va*) is within distance ?/2  from A, for all k 2 k'. Since the the solution mapping  is 
continuous  in initial conditions  and A is Lyapunov  stable, ac(tk, ak)  is within  distance  ?  from A, 
for some k 2 k'-a  contradiction. 
Consequently,  for every  ? > 0 there is some finite time after which  the whole set .?(t)  is within 
(Hausdorff)  distance ?  from the set A  and remains  there. Thus V(t) =()  d a --t  VO  < V(0) 
implying  that for some t one must  have V(t) < 0. But the latter  contradicts 
V(t)=f  div;(c  )dc=0,  Vt?0, 
by Liouville's  theorem.  Q.E.D. 1398  K.  RITZBERGER  AND  J.  W.  WEIBULL 
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